Transnational summer school “Neo-securitization of borders”

The notion of security has always been central to European border policies, but it has taken on a new dimension in the 21st century. Conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Africa have reignited debates over borders as lines of defense for peace and stability. The European Union’s borders—particularly those of neighboring member states such as Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria—have become strategic observation points in the face of growing geopolitical tensions. Security in Europe no longer relies solely on internal mechanisms but also on the protection of external borders against military threats, terrorism, or hybrid forms of warfare, including cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. This new security configuration redefines border defense mechanisms in Europe, requiring an increasingly militarized and technologically advanced approach to border zones.

The rise of migration as a major issue in the European public debate has reinforced the notion of “neo-securitization.” Migratory flows from regions marked by war, poverty, or repression have led the European Union to reconsider its border management strategies. Migration, at times perceived as a threat to European cultural identity, has prompted the adoption of increasingly strict policies aimed at controlling the movement of people. Borders thus become spaces where notions of citizenship, belonging, and identity are negotiated. Migration management — illustrated by agencies like Frontex—reflects this securitization logic, where borders are no longer merely geographical lines, but arenas where European values are defined. Within this context, the issue of welcoming refugees and migrants intersects with security concerns, intensifying tensions between humanitarian ideals and the protection of national identities.

A key question within the framework of neo-securitization is which borders should be strictly secured. Internal borders within the Schengen Area are no longer necessarily physical dividing lines but have evolved into sites of digital and technological control (e.g., drone surveillance, facial recognition cameras, biometric databases). In contrast, the EU’s external borders — particularly in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe—are subject to more tangible forms of securitization, including walls, fences, and increasing militarization. This differentiation between internal and external borders reflects an asymmetric approach to securitization, with surveillance and control measures being more intensively deployed at entry points to the Union. Moreover, this securitization policy can impact national sovereignty, as border management becomes a shared responsibility with supranational EU institutions—particularly with regard to maritime borders.

The emergence and expansion of physical walls or fences at European borders (such as those between Hungary and Serbia, or Greece and Turkey) symbolise the phenomenon of “rebordering”—a renewed trend towards the closure and physical demarcation of borders in response to globalisation and transnational mobility. These walls are seen both as a reaction to so-called “uncontrollable” migratory flows and as attempts to safeguard internal political and social stability. This rebordering extends beyond physical border control: it represents a return to a more state centred and nationalist view of borders, reflecting a logic of closure and the reinforcement of borders as markers of national distinction. These walls, beyond their physical presence, reinforce the idea that borders are no longer merely geographical but ideological spaces, sites of differentiation between “inside” and “outside,” between citizens and non-citizens.

Borderland migration policy is frequently conceptualized as an attempt to strike a balance between the paradigms of human security and national security. The human security perspective emphasizes how systemic measures adopted by the state affect the well-being, rights, and safety of individual migrants or prospective migrants, whereas the national security perspective prioritizes state sovereignty, border control, and broader national interests in policy-making.

Recent developments along the external – and by extension, internal – borders of the European Union exemplify this tension. Since 2021, the Polish-Belarusian border has been at the center of a protracted migration crisis. Thousands of migrants, primarily from African countries and transported to the border by the Lukashenko regime, have sought entry into the European Union in pursuit of improved living conditions. This situation has placed Polish authorities in a complex position, tasked with balancing their obligations to defend both national and EU-level security through reinforced border protection, while simultaneously upholding international legal commitments such as the 1951 Geneva Convention, which protects the rights of asylum seekers. The migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border has frequently been described in public discourse as an example of the “weaponization of migration”. This term refers to the strategic use of migratory movements by state (or non-state actors) to exert political pressure, destabilize neighboring countries, or achieve broader geopolitical goals. By doing so, migration is no longer simply a humanitarian or socio-political issue, it became a calculated tool of hybrid warfare, designed to create disruption, generate internal divisions within the EU, and test the resilience of its border and asylum policy.

This crisis has triggered a multi-dimensional response involving numerous state and non-state actors, as well as the formulation of new policies concerning both border and human security. These dynamics are observable not only along the EU-Belarusian frontier, but also along internal borders such as the German-Polish boundary. Infrastructural developments and the tightening of border controls have been accompanied by legal reforms – illustrated by the proposed revision of the Schengen Borders Code and the Regulation of the Polish Council of Ministers dated 27 March 2025, which temporarily restricts the possibility of applying for asylum at the border with Belarus.

The working group will concern itself with the following questions:

1. How can the paradigms of human security and national security be reconciled within contemporary policy-making frameworks?
2. In what ways is migration instrumentalized and weaponized in the context of border pressure and the securitization of border protection?
3. How do states strategically exploit migration and refugee flows to advance national security or geopolitical objectives?
4. How do political discourse and prevailing narratives on borders and migration influence the development, interpretation, and implementation of legal regulations concerning asylum and asylum procedures?
5. What are the potential effects of border-hardening regulations on the securitization of both the external and internal borders of the European Union?

European borders have been profoundly shaped by internal and interstate conflicts, revealing both their fragility and their capacity for resilience. From the splintering of Yugoslavia to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as various territorial disputes throughout European history, borders have been redrawn, contested, and even erased. The external borders of the European Union are also being tested by migratory dynamics driven by conflicts outside the EU. Far more than mere lines of separation, borders are dynamic spaces, sometimes permeable, marked by processes of transformation and adaptation. In times of crisis, they can be adjusted to new geopolitical realities and territorial re-compositions.

This working group will explore the mechanisms that enable borders to withstand the shocks of conflicts and examine the efforts made to stabilize them, particularly the role of states and European institutions

In his book Borders as Infrastructure – The Technopolitics of Border Control, the Dutch philosopher Huub Dijstelbloem (2021) examines how infrastructure, technology and human actors interact in shaping Europe’s external borders. Building on theories by French sociologist Bruno Latour and German Philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, which address the material and spatial dimensions of politics, he develops a concept of borders as complex and mobile infrastructures shaped by politics, which in turn also shape politics. Looking at architecture and procedures at Schiphol international airport in Amsterdam as well as the organization of surveillance systems in the Mediterranean Sea and reception centers for migrants on the Greek islands of Lesbos and Chios, he analyses how border infrastructures organize the mobility of different categories of people, constitute compromises between securitization and humanitarianism and shape the European project.

The working group will read and discuss Dijstelbloem’s book against the background of securitization theory. Together, we will develop an answer to the following questions: How far and in what respects do the material and technological infrastructures of the external European borders contribute to the (neo)securitization of human mobility? How does this securitization interact with humanitarian approaches to migration and their manifestations in border infrastructures? What does this mean for the European Union as a political project?

State borders vary in their nature: some follow geographical features such as rivers, mountains or seas, while others have been artificially drawn. Accordingly, they are sometimes easily passable, sometimes difficult to access. Many border areas have been shaped by historical armed conflicts, which have caused borders to shift – sometimes just once, sometimes multiple times, and in different directions. The impetus for these shifts either came from the neighbouring states or was influenced by external powers such as hegemonic powers. In other border areas, peace has prevailed for a long time. Borders can take on very different forms: between large and small states, with few or many neighbours, or around enclaves. Some run along linguistic or cultural boundaries, others run through regions that form a common cultural area with their own dialects. The economic and political systems on either side of a border can be similar or completely different – even to the point of dividing democracy from autocracy. The supranational European Union also has external borders.

These patterns of borders and their structural characteristics influence the behaviour of people at the border: how often, for what purpose and under what conditions they cross it. They also affect how people feel about the border, whether a border functions more as a security tool or as a place of bridge-building – and to what extent cross-border institutions and procedures are established.

The participants of the working group therefore ask: Are there recurring patterns or even causalities between the type of border and its political and security design? And finally: What type of security is appropriate for what type of border?